

# Enterprise Security: Attacks and Defenses

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## Lecture Overview

- Security Models
- Risk and Risk Analysis
  - How to define what you have and what's important
- Risk Management
  - what is it? Why is it “management” and not something else?
- Attacks
  - How can you assess risk w/out an understanding of possible attacks?
- Defenses
  - Once we define some attacks, begin to consider ways to defend

# Quiz

15 MINUTES

<https://tinyurl.com/quiz-mis-du>

## What We Learned So Far


- **Security is Multi-faceted:** Covers network, system, cloud, AI, and physical domains.
- **Scaling Security:** From personal to enterprise-level risk and strategy evolve with scale.
- **Enterprise Security is Unique:** Strategic, budget-aware, people/process/tech driven.
- **Security is Not One Action:** It is a continuous, systemic process—no single fix.
- **Four Pillars of Security:** Computing systems, Networks, Cryptography, and Human behavior.
- **Policies & Organizational Dynamics:** Security policies, budgeting, and systemic risks play critical roles.
- **Ten Laws of Security:** From "Attackers always find a way" to "Security is a process."

# Security Models


*A computer security model is a framework for defining and enforcing security rules. It may be based on access rights, computation models, distributed systems, or no specific theory. These models are applied through security policies.*

## Example Security Model: ACL

# Access Control List



## Example Security Model: RBAC



Learn more! (google “security models”):-)

*ACL ∨ RBAC ∨ ABAC<sup>1</sup> ∨ CBAC<sup>2</sup> ∨ DAC<sup>3</sup> ∨ MAC<sup>4</sup> ∨ ...?*

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<sup>1</sup>Attribute-Based Access Control

<sup>2</sup>Context-Based Access Control

<sup>3</sup>Discretionary Access Control

<sup>4</sup>Mandatory Access Control



## How likely you are going to be attacked?

### Attack Trees

Conceptual diagrams showing how an asset or target might be attacked.

The **GOAL** in this image is to open the safe.

The **PATHS** below show ways to perform the action.

Each of the blocks also has a letter (**I** or **P**) to indicate whether the method is likely based on current conditions.






Image source: Bruce Schneier – [schneier.com](https://schneier.com)

# How likely you are going to be attacked?

## Attack Trees

The **GOAL** in this image remains to open the safe. If one has **KNOWLEDGE** about an attacker, the paths might include **COST** and need for **SPECIAL EQUIPMENT (SE)**.

**IDEA:** Find paths at lowest cost that require no special equipment — these are most likely to be exploited by an attacker. Protect those assets first! (Harder ones are less likely to be targets.)



## Cyber Kill Chain (CKC)

*Security Strategy has focused in the past on keeping the bad guys out.*

**Assumption:** *if you keep out the bad guys you'll be safe.*

*What's wrong w/this assumption?*

# Are you prepared to protect?

## Understanding the Cyber Kill Chain

- Proposed by Lockheed Martin in 2011<sup>5</sup>.
- The **end goal** is: *Complete the mission*.
- Each preceding step represents a stage attackers use to get closer to that goal.
- If you assume your network is **already breached**, adversaries may be found at **any stage** — not just at initial entry.


*The Cyber Kill Chain is a series of steps that trace the stages of a cyberattack—from early reconnaissance to data exfiltration. It helps defenders understand and combat threats like ransomware, security breaches, and advanced persistent threats (APTs).*

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<sup>5</sup><https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/capabilities/cyber/cyber-kill-chain.html>

# Are you prepared to protect?

## Cyber Kill Chain



# Risk Analysis

## Key Questions and Considerations

- You can't protect everything — so how do you identify what's **most important**?
- Evaluate your organization: take inventory and define what is truly valuable.
- Define metrics to guide the assignment of appropriate security controls.
- If possible, understand the adversary:
  - Why do they want access?
  - How might they attempt to obtain it?
- Decide how to allocate your limited resources to maximize protection of critical assets.
- There is no one-size-fits-all solution — **every organization is different**.

## Issues to Consider

- **Scale:** How does your risk model change as the organization grows?
- **Preventative Controls:**
  - How do you select the right tools, controls, and systems?
  - Many vendors compete—how do you choose wisely?
- **Detection:**
  - How do you detect if your prevention has failed?
  - Can you identify threats already inside your systems?



## Issues to Consider

### Assets

- Use NIST's *potential impact of loss* as a guide.
- How would you function without asset “X”?
- Assign higher scores to more valuable or mission-critical assets.





# What is Risk Management?

## Risk Management is a Process

- Analyze where compromises might occur.
- Define the consequences of those compromises.
- Identify ways to reduce the **probability** and/or **severity** of compromise.
- If you can fully prevent an incident — great!
- If not, plan for how to **limit the damage** and recover quickly.



# Risk Management Process


Addresses SIX areas and covers affected elements for those areas



Donaldson, Scott E., et al. "Managing an enterprise cybersecurity program." Enterprise Cybersecurity: How to Build a Successful Cyberdefense Program Against Advanced Threats (2015): 243-262.


# Risk Management Process

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## Assets → People



## Assets → Data



# Assets → Systems



## Assets → Facilities




# Vulnerabilities, Threats, Attacks, Exploits





# Vulnerabilities


- A **vulnerability** is the quality or state of being exposed to the possibility of being attacked or harmed.
- In cybersecurity, vulnerabilities are typically understood in the context of the **CIA triad**:
  - **Confidentiality**
  - **Integrity**
  - **Availability**



# Threats

- How can vulnerabilities be exploited?
  - This might be intentional, accidental, random, natural, man-made
- Consider creative ways to apply “Murphy’s Law” Threats

*“Anything that can go wrong, will go wrong”*



## Risks

- No Threat? No Risk!
- No Vulnerability? No Risk!
- Therefore: Threats + Vulnerability = Risk
- Risk exists only when both a threat and a vulnerability are present.
- Defining risk involves:
  - The value of the asset
  - The severity of the threat
  - The understanding of the vulnerability
- This is ultimately a **judgment call**.

## Common Pitfalls

- **Underestimation:** Failing to understand actual threats or vulnerabilities.
- **Risk Blind Spots:** Ignoring certain threats or missing them entirely.

# Controls

## Security Controls

To reduce risk, apply **security controls** — measures designed to manage, mitigate, or respond to potential threats and vulnerabilities.

## Possible Outcomes

Security controls can help in one or more of the following ways:

- **Reduce probability** of a threat exploiting a vulnerability.
- **Reduce impact** if an exploit occurs.
- **Detect** when a threat event is occurring.
- **Collect evidence** for post-incident analysis, investigation, or legal action.

## Attacks

- Offline Attacks: e.g., *Stuxnet*
- Viruses, Trojans, and Worms: Classic malware types
- Persistence / Command & Control: e.g., *Cobalt Strike*
- Custom-Created Malware: Tailored for specific targets
- Polymorphic Code: Constantly mutating to evade detection
- Intelligent Analysis: Adaptive, environment-aware behavior
- Automated and Polymorphic Attacks: Fully self-modifying delivery
- Firmware and Supply Chain: Targeting hardware and embedded systems



# Types of attackers

## Intent versus Motive

- Opportunistic Attacks
- Resources – Money – All fields
- Organized Crime
  - Resources/Information – Money – retail, health, finance
- Espionage
  - Trade Secrets – Money – tech, health, finance, defense
- Nationstate
  - Resources/Secrets – Military – defense, core infrastructure
- Hacktivist
  - Secrets – Attention – defense, energy, large corp, police



# Vulnerabilities, Threats, Attacks, Exploits

- **Vulnerability**

An identified weakness of a controlled system in which necessary controls are not present or are no longer effective

- **A threat**

An object, person, or other entity that represents a constant danger to an asset

- **Attack**

A deliberate act that exploits a vulnerability to achieve the compromise of a controlled system


- Accomplished by a threat agent that damages or steals an organization's information or physical assets

- **Exploit**

A technique or mechanism used to compromise a system

## Onion Model of Cyberdefense

- The **target** (e.g., customer data) lies at the center.
- Surrounding the target are multiple **layers of defense**:
  - Controls (e.g., firewalls, authentication)
  - Monitoring mechanisms (e.g., IDS, SIEM)
- Each layer slows down or repels the attacker.
- The more layers in place, the harder it is to reach the target.
- Once inside the core, **all internal assets may be exposed**.





## Garlic Model of Cyberdefense

- Targets remain at the **center**, but each is in its own isolated **enclave**.
- Each enclave is surrounded by its own **defensive layers** (controls, monitors).
- More layers = more difficulty for the attacker to reach the target.
- **Only the target within the breached enclave is exposed**; others remain protected.
- Requires an attacker to **independently breach each enclave**.

### Implications

- **Takes more time to build** (architectural complexity).
- **Takes more time to breach** (higher attacker effort).



## In-house and External Penetration Testing

- **Know your vulnerabilities** before attackers do.
- Be **ruthless and objective** — no room for internal bias or compromise.
- Build and test in your own **sandboxed environments**.
- Always maintain and validate a **disaster recovery plan**.



# Question?